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Abstract
Professor Jenicek’s paper is confused in that his proposal to ‘integrate’ what he means by
‘evidence-based scientific theory and cognitive approaches to medical thinking’ actually
embodies a contradiction. But, although confused, he succeeds in teaching us more about
the EBM debate than those who seem keen to forge ahead without addressing the underly-
ing epistemological problems that Jenicek brings to our attention. Fundamental questions
about the relationship between evidence, knowledge and reason still require resolution if
we are to see a genuine advance in this debate.
Introductory remarks: on being smart
enough to feel confused
A philosophy student developing an inquiry into the field of ‘bad
arguments’ would face two immediate and underlying puzzles:
Firstly, why is the field so large, and secondly, why are so many
very well qualified academics amongst its contributors? [1] Our in-
tuition on reading Professor Jenicek’s article in the recent EBM
thematic edition of the Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice
(hereafter referred to as “EBM-Cog”) was that there was some-
thing not only deeply confusing but also fundamentally confused
about it. Of course there is a need for extreme caution when
reacting in this way, especially to the work of a well-qualified
and well-published contributor to a most serious debate. One
needs to consider the possibility that the work expresses some in-
sight that one has just failed to grasp, despite one’s best efforts. So
it is worth stressing that what follows is simply our best attempt to
make sense of Jenicek’s piece in the context of the broader debate
to which he contributes and to use it to identify and explore what
we regard as a fundamental problem for that debate. Should it turn
out that we have just missed the author’s key point, we invite him
to explain the point we have missed in language we can
understand.
Given that much of Jenicek’s prior work has had to do with how
to construct scientific arguments, many readers may, like us, react
to EBM-Cog by wondering: ‘what is this about?’ Quite often such
a question expresses not anti-intellectualism or a failure to grasp a
set of complex claims, but rather the exercise of critical faculties
generating the sense ‘that a conclusion does not follow, that a line
of argument someone has presented to us is either incomplete or
just plain spurious’. [2] Sometimes understanding the nature of
the problem will require examining fundamental assumptions that
we bring with us to the debate – for instance, assumptions about
the nature of knowledge, evidence and reasoning and the relation-
ships between them. In that case, whether we use the term or not,
in our critical questioning we are doing philosophy. [1,2] On this
point, we suspect that Jenicek would agree with us, though we find
that a philosophical analysis of his own assumptions suggests that
the confusing nature of his paper is not simply the result of the dif-
ficulty of the subject matter nor is it merely the product of the ter-
minological overload that characterizes his work. Rather, at the
core of his thesis is a contradiction. He is committed to incompat-
ible claims about medical knowledge and clinical reasoning.
What makes EBM-Cog interesting is what it tells us about the
broader debate and the fundamental problem the author is
addressing. There is a method of argument in logic called reductio
ad absurdum: if by asserting the truth of a particular thesis we find
we are committed to a contradiction, then, however plausible that
thesis may seem, it must be false. Jenicek is one author amongst
many making serious efforts to resolve problems for Evidence-
based Medicine (EBM). In answer to the question in our opening
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paragraph, arguments can sometimes be bad ones despite being well
informed and well thought through. This is because all arguments
take place in the context of an intellectual history that is not com-
plete. [3,4] If our best efforts to defend a dominant intellectual
starting point lead us to contradiction and confusion, or some other
manner of practical and/or intellectual ‘crisis’, [5] then it may be time
not to expand or develop the existing ‘paradigm’[6] but to revise our
thinking in a more fundamental way. Jenicek deserves credit for
identifying a deficit in EBM and attempting to supplement its con-
ception of ‘scientific’ medicine with alternative ‘cognitive ap-
proaches’. [5] We will argue that the failure of these identified
‘approaches’ to ‘interconnect’ requires us to give more explicit at-
tention to the underlying epistemological assumptions that frame
the EBM debate. While we think he fails to solve the problem he
identifies, that failure can, in itself, teach us something about its
fundamental nature. There are times when proposing a confused
solution to a problem is a better way to move a debate forward than
simply insisting that there is nothing to feel confused about.
Jenicek and evidence-based medicine
For over a decade, Milos Jenicek has offered himself as a ‘voice of
reason’ in relationship to EBM. Specifically, he has published
books and articles asserting the need to integrate principles of
logic and clinical reasoning into the fabric of EBM for the latter’s
goals and aspirations to be realized. [7–10] EBM-Cog goes a step
further, calling for the development of a new healthcare related
cognitive science to bridge the gap between medical science and
clinical practice. EBM-Cog proposes that such a science should
pertain to the care of individual patients, to community medicine
and to public health. Jenicek aims to draw the building blocks of
his proposed new science from EBM, epidemiology, biostatistics,
medical specialties and health management, as well as from phi-
losophy and the humanities. He refers to developments and prog-
ress in these and other spheres but does not elaborate what he
means by them. In many cases his references are limited to self-
citations. The references to ‘developments in the arts and
humanities’, although particularly vague, suggest an awareness
of the need to add a phenomenological dimension to the integra-
tion and emergent cognitive ‘discipline’ that he seeks.
To his credit, and in contrast to some recent literature, [11]
Jenicek stops short of attempting to expand the meaning of EBM
per se to encompass the other disciplines at play in his vision.
Jenicek’s call is nonetheless salient to contemporary issues
surrounding EBM. EBM has for years espoused the integration
of domains other than the results of clinical research into decision
making, namely, patient values and priorities, available resource
issues and clinical circumstances. [12,13] However, it has never
provided practical guidance as to how such integration is to be
achieved. [11] Calls for the integration of the research literacy of-
fered by EBM with humanism in healthcare and person-centered
care have largely emanated from other sources. [14–17] Jenicek’s
previous critical reviews suggest that EBM’s epidemiological ap-
proach to evidence and decision making needs to be supplemented
by attention to principles of logic and inference, [7] and further-
more that EBM needs to acknowledge literature that is broadly
critical of it and its precepts. [18]
The nature of the argument
What, in fact, is Jenicek seeking? His call is richly infused with
what seems at times like an avalanche of arcane philosophical
terms, including ‘iatrosophy’, which strains the ability of even
standard dictionaries to decipher, but which apparently is intended
to mean the study of thinking related to medical examination and
treatment. Our discussion therefore reflects interpretation, or trans-
lation, of the gist of the proposal embedded in EBM-Cog.
In his text and using two figures, Jenicek unfolds a description
of a process that may be simplified, abbreviated and summarized
for purposes of comparison with the standard EBM formula
(Table 1). Jenicek’s description can be seen as interpolating two
additional steps (numbers 1 and 5 of the Table) into the standard
EBM formula for clinical problem solving, a formula that can be
summarized as ‘ask, acquire, appraise and apply’. [19] The EBM
prescription for problem solving conforms closely to the standard
formula for ‘information literacy’ that dates from 1980s visions of
the information age. [20] EBM, in the process of moving from
clinician empowerment via passive skepticism to a more dynamic
literacy movement, [11] adapted the information literacy model to
the practice of medicine. [21] Insofar as this formula is strictly
adhered to, EBM regards the information needs encountered by
clinicians in the course of evaluating and treating patients to be
self-evident and inherently related to research designs. [22] A
related shortcoming of EBM has been observed to carry over into
medical education, starting at the undergraduate level. Maggio
et al. [23] reviewed published reports of EBM related educational
interventions for medical undergraduates and found that only one
in five included attention to the process of identifying information
needs, that is, step 1 in the Table. The others took the process as
self-evident for the purposes of their structured curricular
approaches. In the later stages of the problem solving cycle, the
EBM literature considers the integration with other knowledge
domains of information gleaned from review of published research
to be entrustable to a process with which EBM need not be
Table 1 EBM-Cog’s representation of the process leading from inquiry
to decision and action has been condensed and simpliﬁed and abbrevi-
ated for the purpose of comparison to the standard EBM formula for ‘ev-
idence literacy’ as typically taught in EBM workshops. Steps 1 and 5 are
characteristically omitted from the EBM formula
EBM-Cog (Jenicek 2015) EBM (Dawes et al.[19])
1. Delineating a healthcare problem 1. -----
2. Identifying key questions and
information needs
2. Ask a question
3. Collecting and summarizing
relevant evidence, observations
and measurements
3. Acquire the evidence
4. Evaluating relevant evidence,
observations and measurements
using the tools of epidemiology,
biostatistics and qualitative research
4. Appraise the evidence
5. Reasoning about the results of
the previous steps
5.-----
6. Formulating recommendations,
such as those found in clinical
practice guidelines; decision making
6. Apply the evidence to
decision making
(‘evidence to action’)
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concerned. The EBM literature does not go beyond superficial ac-
knowledgement of the relevance to that process of clinical and social
context as well as patient values and preferences. [12,24–29] In other
words, step 5 of Jenicek’s schema, as simplified in our Table, is omit-
ted. It is here that his quest seems most importantly to come to bear.
Jenicek’s solution to evidence-based
medicine’s problem
Familiarity with intellectual history helps to explain why EBM
literature typically omits Jenicek’s step 5. It has been argued that
EBM’s intellectual heritage is ‘positivist’ in nature, [24–29] and
while this claim has been at least partially contested by EBM
advocates, [30] EBM’s consistent association with a conception
of clinical reasoning that places research evidence at the top of a
generic epistemic hierarchy (where famously mechanistic
reasoning/‘pathophysiologic rationale’ and clinical judgment sit
somewhere below) strongly suggests a link between the core ideas
espoused by EBM authors and conceptions of causal reasoning de-
veloped by empiricist philosophy. The positivists’ model of rea-
soning is typically characterized as ‘deductivist’ because it
effectively equates rational argument – the presentation of good
reasons to believe a conclusion - with logical validity. A deduc-
tively valid argument is one in which the conclusion follows
logically from the premises presented, meaning that to deny the
conclusion while asserting the truth of the premises is to be guilty
of a formal contradiction. Deduction as a logical process cannot
generate knowledge, because a deductively valid argument simply
makes explicit a conclusion already ‘contained’ within the pre-
mises. And the great positivist thinkers [31–33] are clear that it
is the process of observation, the acquisition of empirical data, that
generates the knowledge reported by true premises. Thus, all
knowledge (including any knowledge expressed in highly abstract,
theoretical statements) is ultimately based on, or ‘comes from’,
empirical evidence. As the great empiricist philosophers (most no-
tably Locke [34] and Hume [35]) argued, ‘reason’ is not the source
of knowledge. The positivists (or ‘logical empiricists’) add to this
a focus on meaning, asserting that theories are simply ways of or-
ganizing data, and that their meaningfulness, even in the most
complex scientific theories, is entirely a matter of their function
in arranging large amounts of empirical information. Ultimately,
by this view, the adequacy of any theory depends entirely on its
ability to describe and predict the empirical data that will serve
either to verify, confirm or falsify the theory.
Hume famously argued that necessity is not a feature of expe-
rience and that experience simply reveals ‘constant conjunc-
tions’ of observed facts. [35] This idea provides the basis of
the claim that there can be no way of establishing causal connec-
tions other than identifying large-scale correlations of data. As
Locke observed, systematic empirical science is the best way
to gather and describe large amounts of data, such that all disci-
plines devoted to the study of reasoning (most notably philoso-
phy) must regard themselves as ‘under-labourers’ to the
empirical sciences. [34] Thus, positivism bolstered the view that
only empirical data acquired in certain quite specific ways could
provide ‘objective evidence’, giving rise to an intellectual cul-
ture in which judgment, personal experience and context-
specific information were regarded with suspicion as
‘subjective’ factors, and even mechanistic reasoning was
accorded a lower epistemic status than the gathering of informa-
tion. [2,3,36,37]
Positivist assumptions are so deeply embedded within our
contemporary ‘common sense’ that they may strike some ‘prac-
tically minded’ authors as too obvious to require defense or
even explicit articulation. [2,37] In fact, far from being sheer
common sense or ‘just plain obvious’, this philosophical posi-
tion has been subjected to extensive criticism, and the problems
it creates for scientific practice have been well documented.
[4,38,39] Rationalist thinkers have argued that an adequate ac-
count of many forms of scientific reasoning requires positing in-
nate human capacities ‘not based on experience’ to ‘generate
hypotheses about what in general the world might possibly be
like’ and then to ‘reject those we see could not include our-
selves and our experiences’. [4] The debate has by no means
been ‘settled’ one way or the other, but few would now defend
the strict empiricism of the logical positivists, precisely because
it seems too restrictive to explain how many ordinary cases of
reasoning are legitimate. [3,37]
That said, the influence of positivist ideas on the development
of EBM seems clear – its privileging of research evidence over ex-
pert opinion, limited, personal, context-specific experience, intui-
tion and mechanistic reasoning would seem to follow (strictly
and deductively) from the conceptions of knowledge and reason-
ing developed in the empiricist tradition. The one clearly episte-
mological thesis associated with the various statements of EBM
over the decades has been the idea of a ‘hierarchy of evidence’.
Tonelli [40] argues that, in EBM, the results of empirical re-
search function as ‘the major premises’ from which conclusions
about particular cases are deduced. The problem, of course, (as nu-
merous authors have noted over a number of years [1]) is that the
process is invalid as no conclusion about any specific case follows
deductively from general premises. Hence, despite all of the
references in EBM literature to the need to ‘integrate’ other
warrants for practical conclusions to bridge the logical gap, the
process goes largely unexplained. [40]
This seems to be Jenicek’s point of entrance to the debate. He
hopes to supplement EBM with ‘gnostic processes’ which, it
seems, we should construe as forms of reasoning that go beyond
the strict empiricist model of deductive validity. He characterizes
these ‘gnostic or epistemological processes’ as ‘those processes
that generate knowledge’ and his whole point seems to be that
you need much more than the Humean/positivist model of ‘obser-
vation plus deduction’ to arrive at any substantive conclusions. If
the ‘gnostic process’ is anything other than strict logical deduc-
tion (from premises derived from observation) and it does really
‘generate knowledge’, then that seems to imply some form of ra-
tionalism in epistemology. In short, he supplies a rationalist solu-
tion to the problem created by EBM’s empiricism. Step 5 of his
proposed ‘new medical cognitive science’ simply inserts a con-
ception of reasoning that is logically incompatible with empiri-
cism into a process whose basis and legitimacy derives from
empiricism. This perhaps explains why standard EBM literature
has tended to omit this step.
Quite apart from the difficulties in understanding the specific
nature of this supposed solution, (for example, how precisely the
forms of reasoning Jenicek proposes work, especially against the
background of his own, deeply confused, approach to
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philosophical logic [41,42]), we have a problem with the idea of
‘supplementing’ one approach with another when the two seem
logically incompatible. EBM-Cog is confusing not just because
it adopts a general stylistic approach of ‘why choose one familiar
word when five unfamiliar ones will do just as well?’ It is
confusing because at its own ‘base’, there seems to be a fundamen-
tal confusion. If EBM’s whole basis for privileging certain sorts of
evidence over others is philosophically unfounded (i.e., if empiri-
cism is the wrong philosophy, which it must be if Jenicek’s
implicit rationalism is tenable) then the correct thing to do is not
to supplement this philosophy with something else but to reject
it altogether.
Jenicek’s characterization of clinical reasoning might be
defended by claiming either that medicine is not a science, or that
science is not the strict, empirical-deductive process described by
the positivists. At points he seems to be saying both of these
things. But either way, he no longer has a position that seems com-
patible with EBM. What we need is not a ‘paradigm extension’ but
rather a new (or different) paradigm. Or even better, (dropping the
unnecessary and inappropriate use of Kuhn’s jargon, an intellec-
tual pretension for which Jenicek cannot be held responsible as it
has been part of the debate since 1992 [6]), what we need is a dif-
ferent way of thinking about rationality and decision-making in
clinical practice.
Conclusion: implications for ‘the
evidence-based medicine debate’
For this commentary we have chosen to avoid dwelling on the
many points of unclarity that make EBM-Cog a confusing read
and to focus on an issue that may not immediately strike some
readers as crucial, but whose significance cannot be overstated
in any serious analysis of the current EBM debate. That is, the
question of epistemic commitment: a phrase we use here to indi-
cate the underlying presuppositions about the nature of
knowledge to which contributors to a discussion commit them-
selves by the claims they make. At a time when influential
authors are calling for the ‘science’ of EBM to be ‘expanded’
and for its underlying knowledge base to be ‘supplemented’,
[11] it is crucial that we are clear on which assumptions about
knowledge we are committed to if we accept certain claims.
We therefore begin our conclusion by recapitulating our interpre-
tation of EBM-Cog.
Evidence-based medicine has consistently been proposed not
as a trivial or platitudinous claim, but as a substantive thesis
concerning medical knowledge. [1] While the term can of
course be used in many different ways, key defenders of
EBM have, from the outset, asserted the idea of a generic ep-
istemic hierarchy of evidence, with evidence from clinical re-
search at the top and with the randomized trial constituting
the only ‘real evidence’ one can admit to support causal con-
clusions regarding effectiveness. [43] Other clinical research
designs may be admitted, but only on the understanding that
they are imperfect surrogates for randomized trial data. We
have argued that, if such a thesis is indeed entailed by what
its defenders have called the EBM ‘paradigm’, [6] then it is
thoroughly grounded in, and, logically committed to, empiricist
epistemology.
In EBM-Cog, Jenicek proposes a ‘new medical cognitive sci-
ence’. The specific quest appears to be for a construct or model
to enhance our understanding of what the EBM literature terms
‘the movement from evidence to action’. [44] Whereas EBM has
at times verged on a denial of the difference between evidence,
defined as information from clinical research, and knowledge (as
a consequence of its own epistemic commitment), Jenicek
recognizes the need for a cognitive process going beyond the
evidence per se for the latter to have meaningful impact on
practice. While he refrains from explicit alignment with a philo-
sophical school or tendency, we have argued that such a view
commits him to some version of rationalism in epistemology. In-
deed, EBM-Cog’s concluding statement is as follows: ‘Rational
uses of medical evidence are as important as evidence itself’.
While there is nothing evidently absurd in such a commitment, it
is clearly logically incompatible with a commitment to empiri-
cism. It is hard to overstate the seriousness of the error in
attempting to defend a position by ‘supplementing’ it with claims
that are logically incompatible with its own underlying
assumptions.
EBM-Cog, perhaps because of the confused natured of its ar-
gument, has provided us with a useful vehicle with which to ex-
plore the philosophical underpinnings of the longstanding EBM
debate. Perhaps the most useful principle illustrated by our ex-
ploration is that, in the quest to remedy the ills and limitations
of the EBM paradigm, a viable philosophical and epistemologi-
cal framework is the essential starting point. Adding one non-
viable framework, in this case Jenicek’s version of rationalism,
to another such framework (empiricism) can never adequately
fix the latter.
However, precedents pointing beyond the rationalist–
empiricist dilemma exist within healthcare, and we will iden-
tify a few potentially guiding examples. We resist prematurely
plunging into a full-scale attempt to define a path or formula
for achievement of the mission proposed by Jenicek, or to
identify a comprehensive list of ingredients. Indeed, a list of
generic disciplines such as suggested in EBM-Cog, many of
which are themselves populated by conflicting epistemologies
and traditions, is premature. Only after defining a philosophi-
cally viable overall framework will it possible to harvest the
fruits of empiricist methodologies in a fashion that maximizes
their value.
Jenicek himself has at least flirted with bodies of work that
suggest pathways beyond the rationalist/empiricist conundrum.
One is the accumulating literature on ‘dual process’ theory, a
construct that acknowledges that both intuitive and analytic mo-
dalities of cognition operate in the context of clinical practice,
particularly diagnostic reasoning. EBM-Cog cites one source ar-
ticle on dual process theory without mention of its content. [9]
The construct does not itself define an epistemology and is sub-
ject to reductionist interpretations. [45] However, by acknowl-
edging tacit processes at play in medical cognition, it is also
consistent with more explicitly non-reductionist concepts. An-
other example is the notion of reflective practice introduced by
Donald Schon. [46] Schon rejected the notion of professional
expertise as the perfection of the ability to apply fixed rules
and principles to practical problem solving and emphasized the
improvisational dimension (reflection in action) in tandem with
analytical reflection (reflection on action). Schon’s model of
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expertise informed the development of the relationship-centered
care construct. [16,17] The latter is an excellent example of an
approach framed with explicit reference to philosophical frame-
works leading beyond the rationalist–empiricist dichotomy, par-
ticularly the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty [47] and the
writings of Polanyi.[48] Another source cited but not explored
by EBM-Cog is Montgomery’s ‘How Doctors Think.’ [49]
Montgomery’s casuistic approach to clinical problem solving is
based on a reduced importance of empiricist science as the foun-
dational basis of clinical practice, but not as a crucial dimension
of healthcare. These examples, while not providing the finished
blueprint of medical cognition and reflection apparently sought
by EBM-Cog, may nonetheless, at least preliminarily, point the
way to such a thing by demonstrating that one can be empirical
without being an ‘empiricist’ and that it is possible to know
without succumbing to rigid hierarchies of knowledge or of re-
search designs such as those promulgated by EBM.
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